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Introduction
Given a context in which simple majority seems reasonable as a method for selecting a social alternative in a two-alternative contest, there remains to this day sizable disagreement on the best method for selecting an alternative when more than two alternatives are in contention and the social choice is to be based on preferences of the voters.' Two basic positions on this matter are often associated with the names of Borda and Condorcet.2 The Borda viewpoint is a positional approach. It assigns points to each alternative for each voter according to the position of the alternative in the voter's preference order. The winner is the alternative with the greatest point total. The Condorcet philosophy is a binarycomparison viewpoint which only indirectly notes the specific position of each alternative in each preference order. Two selection methods which satisfy Condorcet's criterion-that an alternative with a strict simple majority over every other alternative should be the social choice when such an alternative exists-are (1) Copeland's method,3 in which an alternative's score equals the number of alternatives it defeats by simple majority minus the number that defeat it, and, assuming linear preference orders for voters, (2) the method under which an alternative's score equals the minimum number of voters who prefer it to any other alternative. Elsewhere4 I have compared the Borda and Copeland methods in a variety of ways and refer the reader to this work for these comparisons.
The present paper does not attempt to resolve the conflict between competing positions. Its main purpose is to emphasize in the strongest way possible some of the peculiar consequences that can arise under different selection procedures, thereby dramatizing potential shortcomings of these procedures. The analysis will cover a series of voting paradoxes-i.e., factual results that seem opposed to common sense (at least on first glance). I shall not examine Condorcet's cyclical-majority paradox in detail since it has received so much attention elsewhere.5
To counterbalance the primary emphasis on extreme possibilities, we shall present data from computer simulations designed to assess the likelihood of the several paradoxical occurrences. As might be expected, the general conclusion from these data is that the more extreme forms of the paradoxes are exceedingly rare in practice. ' For simplicity it will be assumed throughout that each voter's preference order is linear, so that he is never indifferent between distinct alternatives. The set A of social alternatives will be assumed to be finite. A summary of the extreme results follows.
1. The dominated-winner paradox. In sequential-elimination simple-majority voting the winner may be Pareto dominated by another alternative. Let p(D) be the probability, given a profile D of individual preference orders on A, that the winner under sequential-elimination simple-majority voting will be Pareto dominated when each of the 3. The winner-turns-loser paradox. There are voter profiles in which the unique Borda pointtotal winner in A is also the point-total winner in one situation which involves it and exactly one other alternative, but is a point-total loser in every other situation that involves it and at least one, but not all, of the other alternatives.
4. The truncated point-total paradox. Let Bk denote the truncated Borda procedure where k points are given for a first-place vote, k-I points are given for a second-place vote, * * *, 1 point is given for a kth-place vote, and zero points are given for votes thereafter. (B1 is the plurality method, and BIAI-1 is the Borda method.) There are voter profiles in which each Bk has a unique winner (k=1, 2, * *, Al-i), no two of which are identical. Thus, with IA I=10, any one of nine of the 10 alternatives can win depending on which the nine Bk procedures is used.
5. Condorcet's other paradox. There are voter profiles for which one alternative has a strict simple majority over every other alternative and all but one of these other alternatives beats the simple-majority winner on the basis of every modified Borda point-total scheme that assigns more points to a first-place vote than to a secondplace vote, more points to a second-place vote than to a third-place vote, and so forth.
The cyclical-majorities paradox and the paradoxes presented in this paper suggest that any more-or-less reasonable procedure for aggregating individual preferences to arrive at a social choice must carry with it criticisms that at least some viewers will find to be damning. The question may then be which procedure or class of procedures is best able to withstand adverse criticism. It is hoped that this paper will stimulate further thinking along these lines.
Preliminary Notation and Definitions
A few conventions used in the paper will be noted here before we proceed with the first paradox. Other notations will be introduced as needed.
A linear order on {x1, x2, * -*, x, I that has xi first (most preferred), x2 second (next most preferred), * * * , and xm last (least preferred) will be written as xIx2* . . xm. The backward cyclic list of orders generated by the linear order xx2 ... xm is the m-tuple of orders As is widely known, the overall winner may lose on the basis of simple majority to one or more alternatives that were eliminated during the process. Under the assumptions used here, this can happen only if there are cyclical majorities. And in this case it is readily seen that the overall winner depends on the order L in which alternatives are introduced into the voting.
A less widely known fact is that, if I A I > 3, the overall winner can be Pareto dominated by another alternative, so that every voter prefers x to y with y the overall winner. The earliest example of this "dominated-winner paradox" that I am aware of (see next paragraph) is given by Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, who for some reason do not remark that the overall winner is in fact dominated, although they do note that it has no first-place votes.8 Explicit mention of the paradox has been made by the author.9
The key to the dominated-winner paradox is illustrated by four alternatives 
An Extreme Result
Although the dominated-winner paradox might be extremely unlikely to occur in an actual situation, it is possible to construct profiles under which the paradox is almost certain to arise. We demonstrate this under the assumption that each possible order L for sequential elimination is equally likely. For expositional convenience, this theorem along with some others presented later will be proved in the Appendix.
It is important to note that the theorem does not say that the likelihood of a dominated winner will be large for most profiles of individuals' preferences. To the contrary, we would expect the general likelihood of a dominated winner to be rather small, and this expectation is supported by the simulation results presented below. What the theorem does say is that, by appropriate and deliberate construction, it is possible to fashion a sequence of profiles with three voters and increasing numbers of alternatives so that, for this sequence, the likelihood of a dominated winner approaches unity as we go further along in the sequence.
Computer Simulation Data
The simulation data reported in this and later sections are based on 1000 randomly generated profiles for each of 12 combinations of specified numbers of voters and alternatives. Thus 12,000 profiles were examined altogether. The preference orders in each profile were generated independently of one another, with equal probability Among the 4,000 profiles with five voters (1000 for each I A l in {4, 5, 6, 7}), 287 (7 per cent) had no simple-majority winner and a Pareto-dominated alternative. These conditions are necessary (but not sufficient) for the occurrence of the paradox. Using a randomly-chosen order of introduction for sequential voting, exactly one of the 287 profiles gave an overall winner that was Pareto dominated. Thus the dominated-winner paradox arose once in 4,000 cases with n= 5.
For 11 voters, the 4,000 profiles included five with no simple-majority winner and a Paretodominated alternative. With a randomly-selected order of introduction, none of these five had an overall winner that was Pareto dominated. For 21, the 4,000 profiles included none with no simplemajority winner and a Pareto-dominated alternative.
Hence exactly 292 of the 12,000 profiles had no simple-majority winner and a Pareto-dominated alternative. The paradox was observed only once in the 12,000 cases. Charles Plott and John Ferejohn have suggested a dual form of this paradox in which the pointtotal order of the first mr-I candidates is reversed when the last-place candidate is removed. To illustrate this reversal, suppose seven men are nominated for the office of president in an organization. A Borda count is to be used, with the top candidate to be elected. Under an appropriate voter preference profile, and based on the rankorder ballots, the election committee determines the following point total order of the seven candidates: Although Kenneth Arrow uses an example such as this to defend the reasonableness of his condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (arguing that the death of one candidate should not alter the social ordering that obtains over the survivors), the example in no way violates his independence condition since different feasible sets or "environments" are involved in the two parts of the example.1' In fact, our example holds faithfully to Arrow's independence condition since the "winner" in each circumstance was based only on voter preferences over the feasible candidates in the circumstance. Given the independence condition, what the example does violate is the dictum that the social choice from a larger feasible set of alternatives ought to be determined from the potential choices from twoelement subsets of the feasible set which, in the case at hand, would be determined by simple majority, since the Borda method reduces to simple majority when it is applied to a two-alternative set.'2
Simulation Results
Since the probability of observing the occurrence specified by Theorem 2 is vanishingly small within the context of n in {5, 11, 21 } and A I in {4, 5, 6, 7 }, we looked instead for the DavidsonOdeh case in which (1) there are unique firstplace and second-place point-total winners in A and (2) the second-place alternative in A loses to some other alternative when the first-place winner in A is removed.
Of the 4,000 profiles with five voters, 2,729 (68.2 per cent) had unique first-place and secondplace point-total winners. Removal of the winner caused the original second-place alternative to become a loser in 57 (2.1 per cent) of these profiles.
Of the 4,000 profiles for n= 11, 3,047 (76.2 per cent) had unique first-place and second-place point-total winners. Removal of the winner caused the original second-place alternative to become a loser in 161 (5.3 per cent) of these profiles. This says that the original unique winner x can be a loser within every proper subset of A that contains x and at least one other alternative, except that x is the winner in exactly one such subset that contains x and another alternative. If A= {x, a,, * * *, alo}, there are 2"0-2=1022 proper subsets of A that contain x and at least one other alternative. The winner in A can be a loser in all but one of these 1022 subsets.
It seems reasonable to refer to the paradox identified by Theorem 3 as the winner-turns-loser paradox. One immediate corollary of the theorem says that if x is the unique point-total winner in A, all but one of the other alternatives can have simple majorities over A.
To examine the effect on the original pointtotal winner when one or more original losers are removed, we looked at the cases of (1) removing one loser and (2) removing all but one loser.
The results for our 12,000 randomly-generated profiles when one loser is removed are shown in Table 1 . For each profile with a unique pointtotal winner, we removed one loser in each of the I A |-1 possible ways and recorded the number of these (r) in which the original winner became a loser. The resultant frequencies for r (expressed as percentages) are shown in The results of removing all but one loser are shown in Table 2 . For each profile with a unique point-total winner we determined the number (r) of other alternatives that had a strict simple majority over the point-total winner. The table displays the frequencies of the several r values for each (n, I A I ) pair. Thus for (n, I A| )=(21, 7), the Table 2 shows an increase in the likelihood that a unique point-total winner will lose to one or more other alternatives by simple majority.
The maximum number of other alternatives that can have strict simple majorities over the unique point-total winner is A I-2. This maximum was observed in 10 of the 2,632 profiles in Table 2 with IA =4; it arose once in the 2,681 profiles with I A = 5; and it was never observed for profiles with I A I > 5. For I A I > 5, no profile arose in which more than three other alternatives beat the point-total winner on the basis of simple majority.
The Truncated Point-Total Paradox
In the two preceding sections we considered the effects of removing one or more alternatives from A. In this section we consider truncated Borda procedures which involve all alternatives in A but assign points only to the first k alternatives in each voter's preference order. As noted earlier, the truncated point-total procedure for k is denoted by Bk. Procedure Bk assigns k points to a first-place vote, k-1 points to a second-place vote, * *, 1 point to a kth-place vote, and zero points thereafter. For example, with A= {a,, a2, a3, a4 , it may  happen that a, is the unique B1 (plurality) winner,  a2 is the unique B2 winner, and a3 For obvious reasons we refer to this as the truncated point-total paradox.
Simulation Results
The simulation results for each of the 12 (n, IA l) combinations are displayed in Table 3 . Tables  1 and 2, Table 3 shows that as n increases the likelihood of getting a larger r-value increases. The percentage of profiles that have more than one distinct alternative in the set of Bk winners more than doubles in going from n= 5 to n= 21. Exactly five of the profiles for Table 3 > 5 is in the Appendix.
The simulation for Condorcet's other paradox was designed to assess the degree of agreement between the Condorcet criterion and the Borda method as well as to test for occurrence of the paradox.
Of the 4,000 profiles for five voters, 3113 (78 per cent) had a simple-majority winner. Of these, the simple-majority winner was also a point-total winner in 2887 (93 per cent); 58 (1.9 per cent) of the profiles with a simple-majority winner contained a point-total winner that Borda dominated the simple-majority winner. In one of the 3113 cases the simple-majority winner was Borda dominated by a point-total loser: I A | = 6 for this case.
Of the 4,000 profiles for n = 11, 2978 (74 per cent) had a simple-majority winner, and 2700 (91 per cent) of these included the simple-majority winner among the point-total winners. Fifty-four (1.8 per cent) of the profiles with a simple-majority winner contained a point-total winner that Borda dominated the simple-majority winner. No profile arose in which a point-total loser Borda dominated the simple-majority winner.
Of the 4,000 profiles for n = 21, 3093 (77 per cent) had a simple-majority winner, and 2598 (84 per cent) of these included the simple-majority winner among the point-total winners. Ninety-six (3.1 per cent) of the profiles with a simple-majority winner had a point-total winner that Borda dominated the simple-majority winner. In seven of the 3093 cases (three each for I A I = 4 and I A I = 5, one for I A I = 6) the simple-majority winner was Borda dominated by a point-total loser.
These data suggest that the degree of discordance between Condorcet's criterion and Borda's method increases as the number of voters increases. This correlation suggests in turn that the likelihood of Condorcet's other paradox increases as the number of voters increases, but this hypothesis is only partially supported by the data, as can be seen from the rows in Table 4 . Looking at the table the other way, we see that the likelihood of the paradox decreases with an increase in the number of alternatives for 21 voters, but similar behavior is not evident for n = 11 or n= 5.
Conclusions
The underlying theme of this paper is the liability of procedures for arriving at a social choice among a number of candidates or social alternatives to criticisms of their overall reasonableness. Such criticisms have been offered in the form of paradoxes which, although they may be unexpected and rare in practice, do in fact point out potential problems in the various procedures. It is hoped that this work will stimulate re-examination of these and other procedures used in voting situations and aid in the further development of analyses designed to weigh the various merits and shortcomings of alternative voting schemes. For each i,j, and k, X>>yi, ajPx, bkPaj, and yjPbk, along with xPbk and aPyi. It is easily checked that some yi will be the overall winner if the order L has the following properties:
Appendix
(1) the last element in L is a yi, (2) the last element from {at,,. , a,,,, b ,I
bm2, x in L is one of the bk, (3) at least one as follows x in L.
Assuming that all I A I ! L are equally likely, the probability that (1) holds is m3/ I Al, the probability of (2) given (1) is m2/(m2+m+1), and the probability of (3) given (1) and (2) is m/(m+1). Hence the probability that some yi wins is at least m6/(m3+m2+m+1)(m2+m+1)(m+1), which approaches 1 as m gets large.
Proof of Theorem 2
With A= {x, a1, , am } and m>2, we construct a profile of 2m+1 orders as follows. The first m orders in the profile consist of the orders in the backward cyclic list C(ama--* a,) gen-
